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COMMENTS
CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION: POWER OF FEDERAL COURT TO ENJOIN
INSTITUTION OF PROCEEDINGS IN A STATE COURT
Denton v. City of Carrollton, 235 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1956)
Plaintiffs, a labor organizer and the union of which he was a mem-
ber, brought suit in a federal district court to enjoin the enforcement
of a city ordinance which required persons engaged in certain labor
union activities to obtain a license. The license fee for each person
engaged in the activity was an initial $1,000 plus $100 each day the
activity was carried on. The penalty for violating the ordinance was
a fine not exceeding $100, or imprisonment not exceeding sixty days,
or both.' Although the district court had jurisdiction, 2 it dismissed
the case without reaching the merits, stating that: (1) to grant the
injunction would preclude proceedings in a state court contrary to
federal statute, and (2) the case was wanting in equity since there
was no showing of danger of irreparable injury.3 The court of ap-
peals, reversing, summarily dismissed the first ground and held that
the district court should proceed to the merits because the facts
showed that there was a reasonable basis for apprehension of irrep-
arable harm- both great and immediate.4
The discretionary power of federal equity courts to interfere with
state activities has been confined within narrow bounds by, (1) statu-
tory limitations, (2) traditional limitations imposed upon federal
courts of equity,' and (3) a series of special rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court for application in the area of federal-state conflict.
In determining whether federal courts may enjoin the enforcement
of state criminal statutes, a careful examination must be made of
these restrictions. Although a federal court may have jurisdiction,
1. The pertinent portions of the ordinance are quoted in note 1 to the court's
opinion. Denton v. City of Carrollton, 235 F.2d 481, 482 n.1 (5th Cir. 1956).
2. Jurisdiction in the principal case was asserted under (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1337
(1952), AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946) (district courts have original juris-
diction of any civil action arising under acts regulating commerce); and (2)
under the Civil Rights Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1952), Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496 (1939). The district court predicated jurisdiction on the latter ground.
3. Denton v. City of Carrollton, 132 F. Supp. 302 (N.D. Ga. 1955).
4. Denton v. City of Carrollton, 235 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1956).
5. One of the traditional rules governing all courts of equity, whether state or
federal, is that the enforcement of criminal statutes will normally not be enjoined
without a showing of irreparable harm, both great and immediate. The rules
governing what constitutes "irreparable harm" are said to be more stringent
in the federal courts than in the state courts. See MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY § 173(2d ed. 1948). The reason for this can probably be attributed to the fact that fed-
eral judges, recognizing the problems presented by dual sovereignty, confine their
discretionary power to enjoin state statutes within narrower bounds than the
traditional rules of equity would warrant.
"It is in the public interest that federal courts of equity should exercise their
discretionary power with proper regard for the rightful independence of state
governments in carrying out their domestic policy." Pennsylvania v. Williams,
294 U.S. 176, 185 (1935). Cf. Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44 (1926);
Massachusetts State Grange v. Benton, 272 U.S. 525, 527 (1926); Matthews v.
Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525-26 (1932).
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it will often be prevented from proceeding to a determination by one
or more of these restrictions.
Of the several statutes which have placed restrictions on the power
of federal courts to interfere with state activities,6 two were perti-
nent in the principal case.7 Title 28, section 1341, of the United States
Code forbids federal district court interference with the collection of a
state tax where a plain and efficient remedy may be had in the state
court.8 An examination of the Georgia law satisfied the court in the
principal case that recovery of a tax, even though paid under protest,
is uncertain at best.9 It has been held that where recovery of a tax
6. There are three statutes in this area not considered in the principal case:
(1) 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1952), which provides that only a three-judge court can
enjoin "the enforcement, operation or execution of any state statute." This
provision is not applicable in the principal case because the ordinance under
attack is not "a policy of statewide concern." Rorick v. Commissioners, 307 U.S.
208, 212 (1939). See also Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935)
(distinction between "state" and "local" officers); The Three-Judge Federal
Court, 1 RACE REL.. L. REP. 811 (1956); (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1952) (enjoining
rate orders of state agencies); and (3) 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1952) (Norris-Laduardia
Act regulating labor injunctions).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1952) (discussed in the majority opinion of the circuit
court, 235 F.2d at 485-86) and 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1952) (relied on by district court,
132 F. Supp. at 303).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1952). Note that the statute requires an "efficient"
remedy. The Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean "adequate"--in the
technical sense used by courts of equity. Town of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326
U.S. 620 (1946); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944).
It has been argued that Congress' use of the word "efficient" was deliberate, and
was intended to restrict federal activity. Note, 59 HARv. L. REv. 780 (1946).
9. "Voluntary payments; recovery back.-Payments of taxes or other claims,
made through ignorance of the law, or where the facts are all known, and there
is no misplaced confidence and no artifice, deception, or fraudulent practice used
by the other party, are deemed voluntary, and cannot be recovered back, unless
made under an urgent and immediate necessity therefor, or to release persons
or property from detention, or to prevent an immediate seizure of person or
property. Filing a protest at the time of payment does not change the rule."
GA. CODE ANN. § 20-1007 (1947). Recoverability of a tax or fine in Georgia
depends entirely upon the interpretation of the above statute. In Dennison Mfg.
Co. v. Wright, 156 Ga. 789, 120 S.E. 120, 123 (1923), the court indicated that
payment of an illegal tax under protest, when failure to ,ay subjects the tax-
payer to prosecution and punishment, is not voluntary within the meaning of
the statute. Subsequently, however, in Strachan Shipping Co. v. Savannah, 168
Ga. 309, 315, 147 S.E. 555, 557-58 (1929) the status of the law on this point was
much confused. It was there held that money paid under apprehension or threat
of criminal prosecution, when no warrant has yet been issued nor any proceedings
begun was paid voluntarily and cannot be recovered. The court, however, in-
dicated that where demands or threats are made by a person clothed with govern-
mental authority to carry them into effect, the money so paid may generally be
recovered. See also Eibel v. Royal Indemnity Co., 50 Ga. App. 206, 177 S.E. 350
(1934) (tax paid under threat of arrest from an officer not having authority to
make the arrest is voluntary and cannot be recovered). In Goodwin v. MacNeill,
188 Ga. 182, 3 S.E.2d 675 (1939), the court held that a fine paid by a person
accused of a misdemeanor in order to secure her release before an appeal had
been taken, was a voluntary payment and could not be recovered, even after the
case had been reversed on appeal and "nolprosed" in the lower court. Three
years later, in Clay v. Drake, 66 Ga. App. 544, 18 S.E.2d 516 (1942), the court
held that fines imposed for violation of an ordinance and deposited with the clerk
of the recorder's court to obtain liberty pending decision in the appellate court
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is doubtful, there is no adequate remedy in the state court and the
statute does not bar a federal injunction. 0 It is submitted, therefore,
that the court correctly held that the statute did not preclude the is-
suance of an injunction.
Section 2283 of title 28, upon which the district court relied, is the
latest expression of a prohibition which has been, in various forms,
part of the Judicial Code since 1793." It provides that no federal
court shall issue an injunction staying proceedings in a state court
unless it can be shown that such an injunction either has been ex-
pressly authorized by act of Congress, is necessary in aid of its juris-
diction, or is necessary to protect or effectuate its judgment, already
rendered." It is to be noted, however, that the prohibition of section
2283 is directed toward staying proceedings 3 in a state court. It
does not prevent federal courts from enjoining state officers from
instituting criminal actions in state courts under allegedly uncon-
were recoverable as money paid involuntarily when the ordinance was subsequently
declared unconstitutional in another proceeding. It is not within the scope of
this comment to distinguish these cases. Suffice it to say that the case law in
Georgia interpreting the above statute is uncertain and confused enough to
warrant the court in the principal case finding that recovery under the facts of
that case was at least doubtful.
10. Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 255 U.S. 288, 295-96 (1921). See
also Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299 (1952); Town of
Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946); cf. Stewart Dry Goods Co. v.
Lewis, 287 U.S. 9 (1932); Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Daughton, 262 U.S. 413,
426 (192.3).
11. For a history of the predecessor of § 2283, see Taylor & Willis, Power of
Fedcral Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, 42 YALE L.J. 1169 (1932-
33) ; Comment, 35 CALIF. L. Rnv. 545 (1947) ; Note, 48 NW. U.L. Rmv. 383 (1953).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1952). Its predecessor incorporated only one exception
to the general prohibition-bankruptcy proceedings-instead of the present three.
28 U.S.C. § 379 (1940). The prior statute, however, was loosely applied, and over
the years, the courts succeeded in carving out a number of exceptions to the gen-
eral prohibition it imposed. Finally, in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S.
118 (1941), the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Frankfurter, challenged
all but one of these judicially improvised exceptions, holding that the language
of the statute must be strictly enforced. See Comment, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 545
(1947). As a result of the Toucey case, Congress passed § 2283 in its present
form, thereby reviving some of the exceptions that Toucey had repudiated. Justice
Frankfurter, however, has interpreted the present provision in the same narrowly
restrictive manner in which he interpreted its predecessor, holding that federal
courts could not enjoin proceedings in a state court even when the state court
had usurped jurisdiction which lay exclusively within the federal system.
Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511 (1955). For a
view contending that Congress did not intend the provision to be applied where
the jurisdiction is exclusively within the federal system, see Kochery, Conflict
of J ir.'sdiction: 28 U.S.C. § 2283 and Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 4 BuFFALO
L. RLv. 269 (1955).
13. "That term [proceedings] is comprehensive. It includes all steps taken
or which may be taken in the state court or by its officers from the institution
to the close of the final process." Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 403 (1935). It
applies to restraint of parties as well as to the courts. Amalgamated Clothing
Workers N. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511 (1955). But see Rea v. United States,
350 U.S. 214 (1956) (federal officer may be enjoined from testifying in a state
court, even though the effect is to prevent a state trial, where such testimony,
if given in a federal court, would violate federal law).
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stitutional or invalid statutes.14 Thus, since in the principal case the
injunction was sought to prevent the institution of proceedings in a
state court, the court was correct in holding that the statute was
inapplicable.
It must next be determined whether, in the exercise of its discre-
tion, the court should have refused to exert its powers because of the
traditional rules imposed upon federal equity courts. Federal in-
junctions against the enforcement of state criminal statutes are not
granted as a matter of course, even though the statute sought to be
enjoined is invalid or unconstitutional.15 The general rule is that a
federal court of equity will not interfere to prevent the enforcement
of an allegedly invalid or unconstitutional state criminal statute un-
less it appears that there is danger of irreparable harm-both great
and immediate; 16 imminence of prosecution is not in and of itself
enough to qualify as irreparable injury. 7  Danger of irreparable
harm, both great and immediate, is sufficiently shown where, 8 (1) the
penalties imposed are so severe that violation to test the statute's
validity will not be risked;19 (2) a property right, such as the right
to work,20 or the right to carry on a business2' is infringed by statute;
(3) the cost of complying with the statute while awaiting a deter-
mination of its validity is excessive, and is combined with criminal
sanctions imposing fines and/or imprisonment ;22 or (4) violation to
14. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see also Fenner v. Boykin, 271
U.S. 240, 243 (1926); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). See MOORE, JUDICIAL
CODE COMMENTARY 408-09 (1949).
15. Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 400 (1941).
16. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1943); Spielman
Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 95 (1935); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S.
240, 243 (1926).
17. "No person is immune from prosecution in good faith for his alleged
criminal acts. Its imminence, even though alleged to be in violation of constitu-
tional guaranties, is not a ground for equity relief since the lawfulness or con-
stitutionality of the statute or ordinance on which the prosecution is based may
be determined as readily in the criminal case as in a suit for an injunction."
Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1943). See also Beal v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 49 (1941); Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge,
295 U.S. 89, 95 (1935).
18. These categories represent an attempt to ascertain, through a careful
analysis of the cases, some of the minimum requirements that the courts will
allow in sustaining a finding of irreparable harm, both great and immediate. It
should be noted that since these are minimum requirements, many of the decisions
fall into two or more of these categories. Nor is it contended that these four
categories are all inclusive.
19. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see also Terrace v. Thompson,
263 U.S. 197 (1923).
20. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); of. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496(1939); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923). See also In ve Sawyer, 124
U.S. 200 (1888); International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236(1918) (any civil right of a pecuniary nature is treated as a property right).
21. Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86 (1949); Hygrade Provision Co.
v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925); Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140 (1924).
22. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
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test the statute's validity would involve a multiplicity of suits each
of which is punishable by fine and/or imprisonment.23
It is submitted that the court was correct in finding that there was
danger of irreparable harm both great and immediate in the instant
case. Had the union elected to comply with the statute while testing
its validity, the cost would have been excessive. Indeed, as the court
pointed out, it would cost one person engaging in these activities for
one year of working days $32,300 to comply with the ordinance's pro-
visions.4 As was earlier pointed out, recoverability of this money
under Georgia law in the event that the ordinance subsequently
should be declared invalid is uncertain at best.25 Nor is the alterna-
tive satisfactory. It is true that the union could have elected to vio-
late the ordinance just once in order to test its validity in the state
courts. However, this would have the effect of precluding any labor
activities in the area until the case had wended its way up and down
the judicial ladder, a process which conceivably could take several
years. Such interruption of union activities strongly savors of an
interference with the right to carry on a business,8 and as applied
to the plaintiff business agent, an interference with the right to work.
There remains to consider what bearing, if any, those special limi-
tations which the federal courts have imposed upon themselves in the
area of federal-state conflict have upon the principal case. This type
of judicial restriction, often called "the doctrine of abstention, ' ' 27 was
raised by the district judge, who felt that the state courts should be
given the opportunity of ruling upon the validity of the ordinance. 28
When a state statute is ambiguous, and its validity depends upon its
interpretation or application, federal courts are required to stay
their own proceedings until the statute has been interpreted2 or
applied 'o by the state courts.31 If, however, the statute has been in-
23. Lee Optical Co. v. Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 128, 143-44 n.37 (W.D. Okla.
1954); ef. Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941); Spielman Motor Sales
Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935).
24. 235 F.2d at 485.
25. See note 9 supra.
26. The right to organize is derived from the Labor-Management Relations
Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952).
27. See Galfas v. City of Atlanta, 193 F.2d 931, 934 (5th Cir. 1952); Govern-
ment Employees Organizing Comm., CIO v. Windsor, 116 F. Supp. 354 (N.D.
Ala. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 901 (1954).
28. 132 F. Supp. at 304.
29. Shipman v. DuPre, 339 U.S. 321 (1950); AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582
(1946); Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942); Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Gilchrist v. Interborough Co., 279
U.S. 159 (1929); Government Employees Organizing Comm., CIO v. Windsor,
116 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ala. 1953), aff'd per ctriam, 347 U.S. 901 (1954). But
see Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949).
30. Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); Watson v.
Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941).
31. Indeed, a federal court may direct parties before it to initiate a suit in
state courts. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940); ef.
Shipman v. DuPre, 339 U.S. 321 (1950).
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terpreted or applied by the state court, the federal court may not
stay its proceedings even though the state decisions interpreting the
statute are obscure or not definitive, 32 but must interpret the statute
in the light of those decisions. Furthermore, if the statute itself is
unambiguous and clear-capable of bearing only one interpretation-
the federal court need not and should not await the state court's
supplying the obvious answer.33 Since the statute in the instant case
was clear, and there was no question of interpretation, the "doctrine
of abstention" found no application.
Inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the court was properly invoked, it
is submitted that the court of appeals was correct in directing a trial
on the merits. The statutory and judicial restrictions on federal in-
terference with state activities were inapplicable, and there was a
sufficient showing of irreparable harm, both great and immediate,
to warrant granting the injunction.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER FOR EMPLOYEE'S
MISCONDUCT
Kendall v. Go're Properties, 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956)
The defendant-manager of defendant-realty company employed a
complete stranger to paint various interiors of an apartment building
owned by the realty company. According to plaintiff's evidence de-
fendants did not require references, nor was any other investigation
made to ascertain the hired man's character or background. The em-
ployee was assigned to paint the apartment of a young woman who
defendants knew lived alone. While in the apartment the "painter"
strangled the tenant. Subsequently, the employee was adjudicated to
be a person of unsound mind, dangerous and irresponsible. In a suit
brought by the administratrix of the deceased tenant's estate, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia directed a
verdict for the defendants at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence. On
appeal the circuit court reversed and remanded, holding that the ab-
sence of any investigation of the employee would be sufficient to sup-
port a jury finding that defendants were liable for the death of the
tenant.'
32. Doud v. Hodge, 350 U.S. 485 (1956); Meredith v. City of Winter Haven,
320 U.S. 228 (1943).
33. "The statutes involved are clear and there is no such need for interpreta-
tion or other special circumstances as would warrant the Court in staying action
pending proceedings in courts of the state ....." Toomer v. Witsell, 73 F. Supp.
371, 374 (E.D.S.C. 1947). "[W]e agree with the District Court that there is
neither need for interpretation of the statutes nor any other special circumstance
requiring the federal court to stay action pending proceedings in the State courts."
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 392 n.15 (1948). The clarity of the ordinance
in the principal case was never questioned by either side. See note 1 supra.
1. Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc., 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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